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the natural law. He only recognizes them,
and is under a duty to employ those means
which will best give effect to these truths.
This is not to deny, however, that moral
conclusions, reached by recourse to the
fixed ideals of the natural law, as a major
premise, will vary in accordance with the
ever changing economic, sociological, technological, scientific, and cultural facts of
the minor premise.

insofar as this means that their intellects
may provide a clearer vision of the dictates
of the natural law, their wills may more
often choose the good, and their acts more
effectually implement their moral decisions.
But it will not be possible for them "to
create moral standards superior to those
their fathers evolved," 23 because man does
not "create" or "evolve" the basic truths of
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. What is meant by law and how many
kinds of law are there? What is natural
law, what is human law, what is the essence
of law, what is the end of law? What are
the relations between the eternal law, the
natural law and positive law?
These are questions posed by Dr. John
C. H. Wu and discussed in the Prologue
of his scholar and very readable book,
Fountain of Justice - A Study in the Natural Law. In answering these questions,
Dr. Wu gives first a synopsis of his own
philosophy of law which is Christian and
Thomistic.
Dr. Wu is singularly qualified to write
in this field. The philosophy of law and
comparative law have been special studies
for him. When he was a graduate student
at Michigan Law School in 1920, being
then only twenty-one years old, he wrote
23 Id. at 314.
t Reprinted with permission, "Dr. Wu And The
Natural Law," 27 Pennsylvania Bar Association
Quarterly 338 (1956).
'Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
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an article for the Michigan Law Review,
"Readings from Ancient Chinese Codes and
Other Sources of Chinese Law and Legal
Ideas." He had heard his professors speak
admiringly of Justice Holmes (then eighty)
and in 1921 he sent the Justice a copy of
the Review. Holmes was much impressed
and from this sprang the correspondence
known as the Holmes-Wu letters, and a
lasting friendship. (See John C. H. Wu,
Beyond East and West, 87 et seq.). In
1921 Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, now
of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, offered young Wu a traveling fellowship in international law under the Carnegie Endowment, which he accepted for
studies at the Universities of Paris and
Berlin. In 1923 he was a research scholar
in jurisprudence at Harvard University
under the direction of Dean Roscoe Pound.
Returning to China, he became successively,
Professor of Law, then Dean of the Comparative Law School, Judge of the Provisional Court of Shanghai and a successful
practicing lawyer. As a member of the Leg-
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islative Yuan, he played an important part
in the drafting of the Constitution of Nationalist China. In 1946 he was appointed
Minister Plenipotentiary from China to the
Vatican. At present he is Professor of Law
at Seton Hall University Law School, South
Orange, New Jersey. He has published
numerous books and articles on law in
Chinese, English, French and German.
Members of the Brandeis Society will recall
(as mentioned on page 278 of his book)
that Dr. Wu spoke at their meeting in
Philadelphia in the winter of 1951 on
"Justice Holmes and the Natural Law."
After stating the above questions and
before answering them, Dr. Wu presents
also another fundamental question: "Why
should we not confine our study to human
law?"-meaning the law that regulates the
transactions and relations between men in
their social life, defining rights and duties,
civil liability and criminal responsibility,
and prescribing remedies. "Why should we
Bring in such things as theology, philosophy,
ethics, sociology, economic theories?" He
answers that the profession of law is not a
mere craft for making a living. He cites
with approval Justice Holmes:
The remoter and more general aspects of
the law are those which give it universal
interest. It is through them that you not only
become a great master in your calling, but
connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its
unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law. I
Dr. Wu goes further. He claims "... there
is no other way of teaching law except in
the grand manner, for the simple reason
that one cannot really know the law without taking account of its sources." He beI
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lieves that if we delve into the cases we
find (quoting one Henry Finch) "the sparks
of all the sciences are raked up in the ashes
of the law." Neither Dr. Wu nor this reviewer would agree with those who hold
that legal magazines should have only articles whose value may ultimately be reflected
in the income account.
Among the definitions of -law Dr. Wu
finds that of St. Thomas Aquinas the most
adequate.
It is nothing other than a certain rule of
reason for the purpose of the common good,
laid down by him who is entrusted with the
welfare of the community and promulgated.
He discusses the eternal law: - God's
Government of all creation according to His
Divine Providence for the good of all; and
the natural law, "a participation in the eternal law by the rational creature," and human law, which is derived from natural law
both by way of conclusion and by way of
determination of certain generalities.
The discussion of the question whether
the essence of law is in reason or in will
is particularly interesting. Much confusion,
it appears, has resulted from failure to
distinguish between the speculative reason
and the practical reason. The former is the
faculty of reason when its object is one of
the sciences, including the physical sciences, where effects must follow causes by
a necessity of nature. Natural phenomena,
for example, are necessary things because,
under given conditions, they cannot be
other than they are. But as human law
concerns the action of beings endowed with
free will, contingent matters are concerned
and so it comes under the practical reason.
Human law has necessity in general principles but not in detailed aolication, which
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involves the evaluation of the end (the
common good), and the selection of means
to attain it. Its essence, therefore, is reason
but the will of the human lawgiver is required for its actual existence and efficacy.
For example, while to do justice is a necessary principle of natural law, the determination by the legislator of what is just,
according to Aquinas, must differ according to the different conditions of mankind.
Kant and his followers failed in the
fundamental distinction between the speculative reason and the practical reason. In
their school the latter is reduced to will and
sentiment.
The rationalists had claimed for natural
law a complete code for regulating conduct down to the smallest details. For them,
under a given state of facts, there could be
only one natural law answer if the truth
were known. They treated law as coming
under the speculative reason. On the other
hand,. the voluntarists, by eliminating reason as the source of law, derived la% from
the arbitrary will of the lawgiver or of the
individual. And so the term "natural law"
was appropriated by various schools which
failed to appreciate the traditional view of
the respective parts of reason and will in
the philosophy of law. Law is, as Dr. Wu
remarks, "a teleological, not a mechanical
science."
Dr. Wu finds that the juridical rationalism
of the eighteenth century led to the juridical positivism of the nineteenth, which
does not recognize the fundamental moral
law as the source of human positive law.
Apparently it was mostly the false rationalistic and rigid notion of natural law against
which Justice Holmes revolted, but when
Holmes "made a wholesale denial of natural law, he fell into Charybdis in shunning

Scylla." Dr. Wu deplored the fact that
Justice Holmes never studied St. Thomas
and I believe he always felt that the Justice, in his heart, was closer to natural law
than his writings would indicate.
Indeed, it would appear that much of
the modern attack on natural law has been
addressed to the rationalistic or individualistic kind of natural law, and not to the
traditional natural law expounded by the
author.
Dr. Wu uses the term "personalism" as
designating natural law political philosophy
because it recognizes the full significance
of the human person, "made to the image
and likeness of God." It treats individuals
as integral-moral persons and establishes
a hierarchy of natural rights, life, liberty
and property. In recognizing both the individual and the social nature of man, and
his rights and obligations, it avoids the
errors of collectivism on the one hand and
individualism on the other.
Under the caption "The Natural Law
and Our Common Law," Dr. Wu traces
the origin and development of natural law
principles in England from the days of King
Ethelbert:-through the time of Magna
Carta, the age of Bracton, from the Year
Books to Thomas More, Christopher St.
Germain, Coke, Holt, Mansfield; and in
this country, particularly in the writings of
the Founding Fathers and in the frequent
application by our courts of principles of
natural justice. The treatment of the common law is particularly interesting because
of the great respect, even enthusiasm, which
the distinguished Chinese scholar has for
our system. He says that:
Nothing is so fascinating as to follow the
fortunes of natural-law philosophy in this
country. Its chief glory is its confirmation of
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the idea that there is a Law higher than
positive laws. In its early days, the American philosophy of the natural law did not
separate itself from religion, and it became
the rock on which a true democracy was
2
built.
In a division of the book called "In the
School of Christ," the author shows many
examples of the incorpation in the common

law of principles taught by Christ. He is not
speaking of revelation but rather of the
teaching which could be within the reach
of natural reason. For, as Aquinas says,
the natural law is "participation in the
eternal law by the rational creature." The
author's view is clarified in the following:
The question has often been asked if
Christianity is a part of the common law.
It depends upon what you mean by Christianity. If you mean a revealed religion, a
Faith as defined by the Apostles' Creed, it
is not a part of the common law in the
sense that you are legally bound to believe
in it. Christianity as a Faith comes into the
courts, not as a law, but as a fact to be taken
judicial notice of, on a par with other facts
of common knowledge. On the other hand,
if you mean by Christianity the fundamental
moral precepts embodied in its teachings,
it is part of the common law in the sense
that all the universal principles of justice
written in the heart of every man are a part
thereof. They are not enforced as specific
rules of law but are applied as guiding principles whereby laws are made and cases
3
decided.
In the Epilogue the author summarizes
his view of the present situation:
2 Id. at 130.
3lId. at 215-16.

At present, American jurisprudence is
going through a crucial phase of its evolution. There is a visible trend toward the
revival of natural-law philosophy, centerc 1
on the dignity of the human person. The
historical situation which has made this
movement not only possible but inevitable
has been very ably described by Chief Justice Vanderbilt: "There has been a marked
tendency to think of man merely as a cog
in the economic machine. Happily, however, this tendency seems to have been
checked, in part because of a postwar resurgence of interest in religion which ix
fostering a militant faith in the worth of the
individual and his capacity for good, and
in part because of our alarm over the spread
of totalitarian government and its effect on
the individual." As I survey the judicial decisions of contemporary courts in America,
I have grounds for hoping that this resurgence of spiritual idealism is more than a
temporary fashion, that it is the beginning
of a truly glorious age in the history of
4
jurisprudence.
As stated by the author, the book is not
a volume of collected legal papers but it
has ajnity of its own. He has drawn liberally upon papers and addresses which he
has published and delivered on various occasions. Dr. Wu's style is engaging and his
writing reflects the vast knowledge he has
acquired in extensive reading in the law
of many countries. At times his ideas seem
to expand beyond the ordinary language of
law and philosophy and burst into poetic
imagery that is pleasant and illuminating.
The book should prove to be a distinct
contribution toward the current revival of
natural law jurisprudence.
4 Id. at 191-92.

